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Abstract Although cooperation among representatives in intergroup negotiation
can improve intergroup relations, when cooperation in such competitive settings is
attributed to strategic goals of the outgroup, it may actually harm intergroup relations.
Here we investigate the possibility that representative’s characteristics (prototypical-
ity and competence) determine whether an outgroup representative’s cooperation (as
opposed to competition) improves or harms intergroup relations. Study 1 showed that
a cooperative outgroup representative (compared to a competitive representative) pro-
duced more favorable perceptions of the entire outgroup, and triggered constructive
behavioral tendencies towards the outgroupwhen the outgroup representativewas seen
as prototypical, yet decreased such constructive tendencies when the representative
was seen as peripheral. Study 2 showed that the outgroup representative’s cooperation
triggered constructive behavioral tendencies only when the representative appeared
as low in competence; when high in competence, the positive effect of representa-
tive cooperativeness on trust and constructive behavioral tendencies was mitigated.
Implications for representative negotiation and intergroup relations are discussed.
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1 Introduction
Intergroup conflict is ubiquitous across cultures, and is often regulated through some
form of negotiation among representatives from both sides (De Dreu et al. 2014).
Although representatives often help to resolve intergroup conflicts (e.g., Kelman 1995,
2005) and to establish more positive intergroup relations (Saygi et al. 2014), their
behavior may also, deliberately or inadvertently, escalate the conflict and damage the
relationships among competing groups.
Using a bottom-up approach to representative negotiation (De Dreu et al. 2014),
we examine when and why cooperative behavior by the outgroup representative will
improve or harm intergroup relations, including constructive behavioral tendencies
defined as group members’ tendency to help and protect the outgroup (e.g., Cuddy
et al. 2008; Fiske et al. 1999, 2002). One example of bottom-up influences in represen-
tative negotiations is when Kelman (1997) applied the problem solving approach to
the Cyprus conflict by bringing together political leaders, negotiators, public-political
constituencies through personal contact, speeches and interviews which led partici-
pants to change their attitude about the conflict as well as the opposing group in a
positive way (Kelman 1995, 2005; Davidson and Montville 1981; Druckman et al.
1988). However recent poll data from Cyprus suggest that even if the outgroup repre-
sentative is cooperative in the negotiations and make concessions on important issues,
citizens would still vote “No” in a likely referendum due to lack of trust towards the
outgroup representative’ cooperative intentions (Seeds of Peace 2013). As such, we
would like to identify the boundary conditions for the positive effects of cooperative-
ness on constructive behavioral tendencies.
Our point of departure is that in order for cooperative behavior by the outgroup
representative to improve intergroup relations, first the representative needs to be per-
ceived as a typical outgroupmember to ensure that the perception of the representative
will spill over to outgroup perceptions and influence intergroup relations positively.
Second, the cooperative behavior of the outgroup representative should not raise any
doubt about the true intentions of the outgroup. We identify two key characteristics
of the outgroup representative that block the positive effects of cooperativeness on
intergroup relations, namely (1) the representative’s peripherality to the represented
group (Oakes et al. 1991) and (2) the representative’s competence.
1.1 Theoretical Model and Overview of Studies
In our overall conceptual model, we define two pathways that explain why the coop-
erative behavior of an outgroup representative may influence the ingroup members’
constructive behavioral tendencies towards the outgroup members who were not even
involved in the negotiations. Furthermore we identified two boundary conditions that
may block the positive effects of representative cooperativeness on constructive behav-
ioral tendencies. In two studies we investigated whether or not the representative
characteristics, namely representative prototypicality and competence will interact
with the cooperative behavior of the outgroup representative to influence constructive
behavioral tendencies towards the outgroup. In part 1 we focus on the moderating role
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Fig. 1 Overall conceptual model that was tested in two empirical studies. Please note that part 1 and 2
were tested in Study 1 and 2 respectively
of representative prototypicality and in the second part of our model we focused on
the moderating role of representative competence. Please see Fig. 1 for our overall
conceptual model wherein part 1 and 2 are tested in Study 1 and 2 respectively.
1.2 Bottom-up Effects of Representative Cooperation on Intergroup Relations
Representative negotiation involves a two-level situation, in which the negotiation
among individual representatives is embedded in a broader intergroup context, and
the broader intergroup relations in turn depend on the way representatives negotiate
(e.g., Knowles and Bassett 1976; Lickel et al. 2000; Saygi et al. 2014). Especially the
second component, or the degree to which representatives’ behaviors impact broader
intergroup relations, is poorly understood (De Dreu et al. 2014).
Current insights rest on relatively indirect lines of inquiry and evidence. First, the
study of problem solving workshops suggests that constructive, face-to-face discus-
sions between representatives are vital for the development of constructive intergroup
relations (Burton 1969;Druckman et al. 1988; Fisher 2006; Tamet al. 2009). For exam-
ple, Kelman (1995, 2005) applied this approach to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict by
bringing together political leaders, negotiators, and constituencies through personal
contact, speeches, and interviews.1 Consequently, cooperation between the representa-
tives improved ingroupmembers’ view of the conflict as well as their perception of the
entire outgroup (Davidson andMontville 1981; Fisher 2006). Second, the notion that a
cooperative negotiation process among representatives can improve relations between
groups resonates with the main principles of the intergroup contact theory (Pettigrew
1 Because these intervention studies lacked proper baseline conditions, did not control for the specifics
of the interactions between protagonists, and did not take place in the explicitly competitive and conflict-
ual negotiation context, they are suggestive rather than conclusive about the possibility that representative
negotiations can have a bottom-up influence on broader intergroup relations. Furthermore, these investiga-
tions did not specifically focus on the cooperative behavior of the representative but rather on the broader
sense of positive contact between representatives. However, they are suggestive of the benefits cooperative
representative behavior may have for intergroup relations.
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and Tropp 2006). The theory proposes that under four conditions - equal status among
group members, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and support from authorities,
a positive contact with an outgroup member can improve the perception of the entire
outgroup (Allport 1954; Druckman 1968; Pettigrew 1998). For example, in the context
of the Northern Ireland conflict between Catholics and Protestants, researchers exam-
ined the link between intergroup contact and action tendencies towards the outgroup.
In addition to direct contact betweenmembers of opposing groups, they also examined
“extended contact” which is defined as the cross-group friendship between another
ingroup member and an outgroup member (Wright et al. 1997). In line with contact
theory and the extended-contact hypothesis (Wright et al. 1997), they found that trust
mediated the effect of both direct and extended contact on action tendencies towards
the outgroup (Tam et al. 2009), suggesting that positive contact, such as through coop-
eration, can improve intergroup relations and resolve intergroup conflicts.
Although these related lines of inquiry are not directly concerned with representa-
tive negotiation, they suggest that cooperative communication during negotiation by
representatives may positively influence intergroup relations. Negotiation processes
are usually categorized as competitive or cooperative (Deutsch 1949; Pruitt 1967).
When negotiation processes are competitive, parties use cheating, act hostile, d o not
exchange information, and try to exploit one another. When negotiation processes are
cooperative, there is exchange of information, parties make concessions, and refrain
from hostile exchanges and deceitful tactics (Bazerman et al. 2008; De Dreu et al.
2007). Previous researchmostly focused on the effect of cooperative/competitive com-
munication on the negotiated outcome or outcome satisfaction. For example, when
negotiation processes were competitive, even if the final outcome was the same, nego-
tiators were less satisfied with the negotiated outcome when the negotiation process
was marked by competitive rather than cooperative communication processes (e.g.,
Curhan et al. 2006; Druckman et al. 1988; Schei 2008; also see Van den Bos et al.
1998). Other research showed that communicating competitively increases fear and
intergroup anxiety (Stephan and Stephan 1984; Wildschut et al. 2003), the cognitive
salience of the intergroup boundary (Wilder 1986), and confirms the categorization
of ingroup and outgroup (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Given this we would expect that
competitive communication of the outgroup representative will negatively influence
ingroup members’ outgroup perceptions regardless of the negotiated outcome.
Conversely, we would expect cooperative communication to positively influence
ingroupmembers’ outgroup perceptions, regardless of the negotiated outcome. Indeed,
in a first study of the effects of representative behavior on intergroup relations, Saygi
et al. (2014) found that cooperative tendencies by the outgroup representative promoted
positive perceptions of, and behavioral tendencies towards, the outgroup as a whole.
From this it follows that when the outgroup representative is perceived as cooperative
(rather than non-cooperative), ingroup members should engage in more constructive
behavioral tendencies towards outgroup members, such as helping, protecting, and
associating with the outgroup (e.g., Cuddy et al. 2008; Fiske et al. 1999, 2002).
However, as we argue in this paper, this should only be the case when the outgroup
representative’s behavior is taken as a reliable signal of the entire outgroup’s intentions.
Cooperation may not always be trusted (e.g., Kramer 1994, 2004a, b). Cooperation
under certain conditions may be seen as manipulative and unauthentic, and could
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potentially backfire on the ingroup. We postulate here that one source of information
that groups may use to infer the authenticity of the other group’s intentions is the type
of representative the group chooses to send to represent itself. When groups send a
representative that looks to be there for strategic purposes and to exact gains—such
as a highly competent negotiator, the authenticity of the group’s cooperative behavior
may be doubted, and the positive effects of cooperativeness on intergroup relations
may be blocked. As such, it’s critical for groups to know which representative to send
if they want to cooperate with the outgroup and want this cooperation to be seen as
sincere. We therefore offer an important contribution to the literature on intergroup
negotiations by identifying characteristics of a representative, whichmaymake groups
see cooperative behavior by the representative as being more or less authentic.
1.3 When Cooperation Backfires: The Role of Perceived Negotiator Characteristics
Both problem-solving workshops and contact theory suggest that a group member
can create a positive image for the entire group by behaving in a cooperative manner
during an exchange with the opposing group, which may in turn ameliorate intergroup
relations (e.g., Brown et al. 1999). However, such member-to-group generalization
rests on the assumption that the representing group member actually represents coop-
erative intentions of the entire outgroup. Signs that contradict such an assumption may
mitigate generalization processes and abolish the positive effects of cooperative rep-
resentative behavior on outgroup perceptions. One such representative characteristic
that may block generalization processes is the representative’s perceived peripheral-
ity to the represented group (Oakes et al. 1991). Another such characteristic is the
representative’s perceived competence. We explain below why these two perceived
negotiator characteristics may be critical in determining whether or not representative
cooperation is seen as authentic and representative of outgroup intentions.
1.3.1 Representative Prototypicality
In Study 1we examined representative-outgroup generalization effects as a function of
the outgroup representative’s prototypicality. According to self-categorization theory
(Turner et al. 1987), group members vary in the extent to which they share common
characteristics of their group that differentiate the group from other groups. Some
group members are more prototypical, in that they possess more of those common
characteristics, and hence they can be considered better examples of the group than
others (Hogg et al. 1993). Group members who strongly match group prototypes can
be referred to as prototypical group members and those who are less prototypical
examples of their group can be referred to as peripheral group members (e.g., Jetten
et al. 2002, 2003, 2006; Van Knippenberg 2000). Accordingly, representatives in
intergroup negotiations may vary in the degree to which they are prototypical or
peripheral members of the group they represent (Van Kleef et al. 2007).
Previous research has shown that positive contact with an individual outgroupmem-
ber can generalize to the entire outgroup (e.g., Johnston and Hewstone 1992; Saygi
et al. 2014;Weber andCrocker 1983), and this effect has been found even in the absence
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of direct contact (e.g., Turner et al. 2007). However, this generalization process is most
likely when group membership is made salient (Vivian et al. 1997), such as by the
prototypicality of the outgroup members (Oakes and Turner 1986; Oakes et al. 1991).
For example, Brown et al. (1999) showed that positive attitudinal generalization was
facilitated by encounters with prototypical outgroupmembers. Similarly, in stereotype
change studies, stereotype-disconfirming information had a stronger effect on gener-
alization when the information was associated with a prototypical outgroup member
(Johnston and Hewstone 1992) or with an outgroup member who was a good fit to the
category prototype (Rothbart and Lewis 1988).
The above suggests that, in representative negotiations, the cooperative behavior of
the outgroup representative may spill over to influence the perceived cooperativeness
of the entire outgroup, but only when the outgroup representative is a prototypical
member. If the outgroup representative is a peripheral member, such generalization
may be mitigated, and hence outgroup cooperativeness may not lead to increased out-
group cooperativeness (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, we propose a moderated media-
tion model wherein cooperativeness of the outgroup representative indirectly (through
perceived outgroup cooperativeness) influences constructive behavioral tendencies
towards the outgroup. These mediated effects are expected to be stronger when the
outgroup representative is a prototypical member rather than a peripheral member
(Hypothesis 2). However, prototypicality of the outgroup representative can poten-
tially influence the spread of any kind of representative characteristic to the entire
outgroup. The effect is not specific to the cooperativeness of the outgroup represen-
tative. For example, if a prototypical outgroup representative is acting unethically in
the negotiations, it would influence the perceived unethicality of the entire outgroup.
Hence, we aimed to identify a moderator that specifically influences the effect of
cooperativeness on intergroup relations.
1.3.2 Representative Competence
In Study 2, we examined the second boundary condition, which concerns the fact
that intergroup negotiations are mostly marked by ample opportunities for distrust
and hostile attributions given the mixed motive feature of negotiation (e.g., Fein and
Hilton 1994; Kramer 1994, 2004a, b;Messick andMackie 1989). Hence, even if a rep-
resentative is a cooperative prototypical member of his group, the opposing party first
needs to trust the cooperative intentions of the representative as well as the outgroup
in order to improve outgroup perceptions. For example, in a recent report prepared
for policy makers in Cyprus it was suggested that one of the main constraining fac-
tors for conflict resolution in Cyprus is that both Turkish and Greek Cypriots do not
trust in the cooperative intentions of each other’s groups. They believe that there is
an ulterior motive behind the outgroup representative’s cooperative behaviors. Hence,
even if representatives behave in a cooperative way, due to lack of trust in the out-
group, cooperation during the negotiations fails to facilitate conflict resolution (Seeds
of Peace 2013).
Along similar lines, Kramer developed a construct called intergroup paranoiawhich
is defined as “beliefs-either false or exaggerated-that are held bymembers of one group
that cluster around ideas of being harassed, threatened, harmed, subjugated, perse-
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cuted, accused, mistreated, wronged, tormented, disparaged, or vilified by a malevo-
lent outgroup” (Kramer 2004a, b). He suggests that intergroup paranoia in the context
of negotiations leads negotiators and their constituents to overly examine the meaning
of each move by the other party and also to obsessively reanalyze both past and antici-
pated interactionswith the other party. In fact, previous research shows that a history of
hostility is not even essential to have a more biased and negative view of the outgroup.
Brewer and her colleague showed that even a mere categorization of individuals into
distinct groups can create an ingroup bias which translates into negative perceptions
of the outgroup members such as untrustworthy, dishonest, and competitive (Brewer
1979; Brewer and Silver 1978). In a negotiation context such negative outgroup per-
ception leads representatives and their constituents to be distrustful and suspicious of
outgroupmembers and also to anticipate competitive negotiation behaviors from them
(Insko and Schopler 1997). Ironically, this means that cooperative negotiation behav-
iors by an outgroup representative are counter-intuitive and rather unexpected (Benton
and Druckman 1974; Steinel et al. 2010), and such counter-intuitive and unexpected
behavior by the negotiators may lead outgroup members to overly examine the mean-
ing of each move. Because cooperation compared to competition by the out-group
representative is more unexpected and counter-intuitive, it should trigger additional
processing of information and a deeper search for possible explanations. If true, addi-
tional cues that may explain the (unexpected) event should be picked up more and
integrated better in judgments and decisions.
One such cue is whether the out-group representative appears competent. Highly
competent people are in control of their behavior, they know what they are doing, and
they pursue their goals effectively (Fiske et al. 2002). When unexpected and counter-
intuitive behavior is performed by highly competent individuals, internal attributions
to deliberate strategizing become more likely, and a highly competent outgroup rep-
resentative may mitigate the positive effect of cooperative representative behavior on
outgroup trust by creating a sneaky and untrustworthy image for his group rather than
favorable perceptions (Boon and Holmes 1991). Thus, we hypothesized that the out-
group representative’s cooperation increases outgroup trust only when the outgroup
representative has low competence, and the positive effect of representative cooper-
ativeness on outgroup trust may be mitigated when the outgroup representative has
high competence (Hypothesis 3). Furthermore, we predicted that cooperativeness of
the outgroup representative leads to higher constructive behavioral tendencies through
trust when the outgroup representative has low competence, but not when the outgroup
representative has high competence (Hypothesis 4).
2 Study 1: Method
2.1 Sample and Design
Sixty-nine undergraduate students (39 female; M = 22.42 years, SD = 5.8) at the
University of Amsterdam participated for monetary compensation. Using a double
blind procedure, participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (cooperative vs. competi-
tive outgroup representative)× 2 (peripheral vs. prototypical outgroup representative)
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between-subjects factorial design. Main dependent variables were perceived outgroup
cooperativeness and constructive behavioral tendencies towards the outgroup.
2.2 Procedure and Materials
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were seated in separate cubicles in front
of a computer. They read that they would be divided into two three-person groups
based on their responses to a personality survey. After they completed the survey,
all participants were told that they belonged to Group O, together with two other
participants who responded similarly to the survey, and that they would engage in
an intergroup negotiation with three other students who formed Group P. Participants
were further told that one of the members in each group would be randomly chosen
to represent their group in the intergroup negotiation, and that the other two members
in each group would be able to observe the negotiation (see Van Kleef et al. 2007).
All participants were then shown the instructions for a multi-issue negotiation
between Group O and Group P (adopted from De Dreu et al. 2006, see Appendix 1 for
the pay-off schedule), in which they had to negotiate about the salary, salary increase,
and duration of the contract. After they read the instructions, all participants were in
fact placed in the observer role, and informed that they would receive feedback from
their representative about the negotiation with the outgroup representative.
To manipulate the prototypicality of the outgroup representative, we gave partic-
ipants additional information after the representative selection procedure (Van Kleef
et al. 2007; Van Knippenberg and Van Knippenberg 2005). Participants in the proto-
typical [peripheral] condition received the following message: “A member of Group P
is randomly selected by the computer to be the representative of Group P. There is one
more thing about this group member that we want to share with you. According to his
score on the personality test, he is [not] a typical member of Group P, whichmeans that
he thinks and acts [does not think and act] like other members of Group P. He is a very
good example [not a good example] of a person with a P-type personality”. Finally
we added an additional sentence to the peripheral condition to prevent participants
from perceiving the peripheral outgroup member as pro-outgroup deviant. The sen-
tence was “According to his score, he also does not have an O-type personality”. Next,
participants learned that they could earn up to 30 euro as a group (10 euro maximum
per person depending on the total number of points they earned on each issue) if the
representatives managed to reach an agreement on all three issues within 10min. If
not, neither of the groups would receive any extra money. Finally, participants read
that they would see the offers made by their own representative but not the offers made
by the outgroup representative. However, they would be shown any messages from the
outgroup representative to their representative. Participants did not actually interact
with another person; rather, the outgroup representative’s behavior was simulated via
pre-programmed messages sent over the computer (see Van Kleef et al. 2007).
The negotiation started and messages sent by the outgroup representative were
shown to the participants. We manipulated the cooperativeness of the outgroup repre-
sentative through thesemessages. Participants observed three cooperative/competitive
messages by the outgroup representative in each round (e.g., “I not onlywantmy group
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to be satisfied, I also want your group to be satisfied”, “I hear often that I am very
nice”, and “Not everything is about money, I do not want anyone to be hurt in this
negotiation” for cooperation; “I only want my group to be satisfied, it does not interest
me how your group likes it”, “I hear often that I can be tough”, “Everything is about
money here, not about whether we have a good time or not” for competition). Fol-
lowing the messages, they were told that their ingroup representative made an offer to
the other group. The ingroup representative’s offers were linear concessions and were
kept constant across the conditions. (Round 1: 20,000 salary/2.5years contract/ 7%
salary increase; Round 2: 20,000 salary/2.5years contract/6% salary increase; Round
3:19,000 salary/ 2.5years contract/ 6% salary increase). In round 3, participants were
told that while the representatives would continue to negotiate, they would answer a
series of questions about their impressions thus far (see below). Because we were not
interested in their reactions to the negotiated outcome but rather the effect of com-
munication during the negotiation, we measured their behavioral tendencies towards
the outgroup as well as perceived outgroup cooperativeness before the negotiations
ended.
Outgroup cooperativeness was measured by five items (“cooperative”, “friendly”,
“nice”, “trustworthy”, “honest”) (1=Not at all, 7=Very much) (Cuddy et al. 2008;
α = 0.90). Constructive behavioral tendencies were measured with three items from
the facilitation tendencies scale of Cuddy et al. (2007). Participants indicated to what
extent they thought their group members would have (1) a tendency to help the out-
group, (2) to protect the outgroup, andfinally (3) to associatewith the outgroup (1=Not
at all, 7=Very much). We asked participants about their group members’ tendencies,
rather than their own tendencies, to reduce social desirability concerns (Cuddy et al.
2008). Please note that outgroupwas defined asGroup Pmembers excluding theGroup
P representative.
Finally, participants completed a manipulation check for the cooperativeness and
prototypicality of the outgroup representative. First, participants indicated to what
extent they perceived the outgroup representative as “cooperative”, “friendly”, “nice”,
“trustworthy”, and “honest”(1=Not at all, 7=Very much), (α = 0.87). Secondly,
we used nine items from Van Kleef et al. (2007) to check for the prototypicality
manipulation (1=Not at all, 7=Very much), (α = 0.92). All items are listed in
Appendix 2.
3 Study 1: Results and Discussion
3.1 Manipulation Checks
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that participants in the cooperative condi-
tions perceived the outgroup representative as more cooperative (M = 4.95, SD =
1.03) compared to participants in the competitive condition (M = 3.77, SD =
1.20), F(1, 65) = 19.02, p < .001,η2p = 0.23. ANOVA on perceived typicality
of the outgroup representative showed that participants in the prototypical condition
perceived the outgroup representative as more typical (M = 4.20, SD = 0.89) com-
pared to participants in the peripheral representative condition (M = 3.14, SD =
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1.28), F(1, 65) = 16.05, p < .001,η2p = 0.20. No other effects reached signifi-
cance, all Fs < 2, all ps > .05. Thus, our manipulations were successful.
3.2 Hypothesis Testing
Table 1 shows means, standard deviations and correlations between the central vari-
ables in the current study. To test our proposedmodel (see Fig. 1), we used a regression
based path analysis with the aid of the PROCESSmacro developed by Hayes (2013) in
order to estimate interactions and conditional indirect effects. Figure 2 includes three
sub-models that we tested separately. Although our primary interest is the moderat-
ing role of prototypicality on the relationship between representative cooperativeness
and outgroup cooperativeness, for the preciseness of our predictions (see Edwards
and Lambert 2007) we also tested the moderating role of prototypicality on the rela-
tionship between representative cooperativeness and constructive behavioral tenden-
cies (see Fig. 2 panel A). In Fig. 2 panel B, we tested Model 2 and 3 wherein we
examined whether or not the prototypicality of the outgroup representative moder-
ates the relationship between representative cooperativeness and outgroup coopera-
tiveness (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore we estimated the conditional indirect effect of
representative cooperativeness on constructive behavioral tendencies (via outgroup
cooperativeness), contingent on representative prototypicality, which is calculated by
multiplying a paths by path b. (Hypothesis 2; Hayes 2013).
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we found a significant interaction effect of represen-
tative cooperativeness and prototypicality on perceived outgroup cooperativeness (see
Table 2). In line with our predictions, the conditional effect of representative coop-
erativeness on perceived outgroup cooperativeness in the prototypical representative
condition was significant and estimated to be 1.867 with a bias adjusted and accel-
erated 95% CI ranging from 1.066 to 2.666. The conditional effect of representative
cooperativeness on perceived outgroup cooperativeness in the peripheral representa-
tive condition was significant and estimated a negative effect of −1.041 with a bias
adjusted and accelerated 95% CI ranging from −1.876 to −0.207. This confirms that
a prototypical cooperative representative can improve perceived outgroup coopera-
tiveness compared to a competitive prototypical representative. However, a peripheral
Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and correlations among dependent variables (Study 1)
Mean (SD) 1 2
Cooperative representative Competitive representative
Prototypical Peripheral Prototypical Peripheral
1. Outgroup
cooperativeness




3.95 (1.04) 3.25 (1.04) 3.14 (0.94) 2.80 (1.25) .327** 1
N=69, SDs= standard deviations, **p< .01
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Fig. 2 The three ordinary least squares regressions estimated and reported in Table 2
cooperative outgroup representative actually produced lowerperceivedoutgroup coop-
erativeness than a peripheral competitive outgroup representative. Furthermore, testing
model 3 in Fig. 2 showed that in fact the conditional indirect effect of representative
cooperativeness on constructive behavioral tendencies via outgroup cooperativeness
was positive and significant in the prototypical representative condition, and nega-
tive and significant in the peripheral representative condition. These results support
Hypotheses 1 and 2 (Table 3).
Taken together, cooperation by the outgroup representative evoked higher construc-
tive behavioral tendencies towards the entire outgroup because of improved coop-
erative perceptions of the entire outgroup, but only when the outgroup representa-
tive was a prototypical outgroup member. When the outgroup representative was a
peripheral member, cooperativeness of the outgroup representative actually decreased
perceived outgroup cooperativeness and hence lowered constructive behavioral ten-
dencies. Clearly, cooperative negotiation strategies by out-group representatives do
not always boost intergroup relations, but can also undermine favorable intergroup
perceptions and constructive behavioral tendencies. It depends, first of all, on the rep-
resentative’s prototypicality. In Study 2, we tested representative competence as the
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Table 3 Model coefficients for the conditional process model in Fig. 1
Moderator Indirect effect Direct effect





−0.246 (0.130) −0.640 to −0.069 0.369 0.403 .363
Prototypical representative
(coded as 1)
0.441 (0.441) 0.099 to 1.087 0.692 0.381 .074
second boundary condition for the positive effects of cooperative behavior by the out-
group representative on constructive behavioral tendencies. In the study 2 we tested
Hypothesis 3 and 4.
4 Study 2: Method
4.1 Sample and Design
Eighty-six undergraduate students (60 females;M=21.12years, SD=4.5) at the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam participated in the study for monetary compensation. Using
a double blind procedure, participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (coopera-
tive/competitive outgroup representative) by 2 (low/high competence outgroup repre-
sentative) between-subjects factorial design. Main dependent variables were outgroup
trust and constructive behavioral tendencies towards the outgroup.
4.2 Procedure and Materials
The procedure was the same as Study 1, with one exception: In addition to coop-
erative/competitive messages, participants also saw 3 high/low competence related
messages. These messages were: “my friends always tell me that I should be in poli-
tics, because I am really good at negotiations”, “people always tell me that I am really
efficient because I can do multiple things at the same time”, “I do not easily lose con-
trol in this kind of situations” for high competence, and “people always tell me that I
should not be in politics because I am not good at negotiations”, “people always tell me
that I am not efficient because I cannot do multiple things at the same time”, “I easily
lose control in this kind of situations” for low competence. We assessed constructive
behavioral tendencies (α = 0.73) as before and also included a 3-item outgroup trust
scale (“To what extent do you believe the outgroup has a strong sense of justice?”,
“To what extent do you believe the outgroup is trustworthy?”, “To what extent do
you believe the outgroup is sneaky?” (reversed item) (α = 0.77). We checked for the
manipulation of cooperativeness of the outgroup representative as before (α = 0.91),
and for competence, by asking to what extent participants perceived the outgroup
representative as experienced, skillful, competent, intelligent, efficient, and confident
(1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much;α = 0.85).
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5 Study 2: Results
5.1 Manipulation Checks
Participants perceived the outgroup representative as more cooperative in the coop-
erative (M = 4.78, SD = 0.96) compared to the competitive condition (M =
3.97, SD = 1.29), F(1, 82) = 11.17, p = .001,η2p = .12. Furthermore, partici-
pants in the high competence condition perceived the outgroup representative as more
competent (M = 4.89, SD = 0.76) than those in the low competence condition
(M = 4.07, SD = 1.07), F(1, 82) = 16.63, p < .001,η2p = 0.17. No other effects
reached significance, all Fs < 2, all ps > .05. Thus our manipulation of cooperation
and competence was successful.
5.2 Hypothesis Testing
Table 4 presents means, standard deviations and correlations between the central vari-
ables in Study 2. To test our proposed model in Fig. 1 we used the same analysis as
we did in Study 1. Figure 3 shows the three sub-models that we tested separately.
Similarly to Study 1, as a stringent test of our predictions (see Edwards and Lambert
2007), we tested the moderating role of competence both on the relationship between
representative cooperativeness and outgroup trust and the relationship between repre-
sentative cooperativeness and constructive behavioral tendencies despite the fact that
our primary interest is the former. In Fig. 3 panel B, we tested Model 2 and 3 wherein
we examined whether or not the competence of the outgroup representative moderates
the relationship between representative cooperativeness and outgroup trust (Hypoth-
esis 3). Furthermore we estimated the conditional indirect effect of representative
cooperativeness on constructive behavioral tendencies (via outgroup cooperativeness),
contingent on representative competence (Hypothesis 4).
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, we found a significant interaction effect of represen-
tative cooperativeness and competence on outgroup trust (see Table 5). As predicted,
the conditional effect of representative cooperativeness on outgroup trust in the low
competence condition was significant and estimated to be 1.911 with a bias adjusted
and accelerated 95% CI ranging from 1.228 to 2.594. The conditional effect of rep-
Table 4 Means, standard deviations, and correlations among dependent variables (Study 2)
Mean (SD) 1 2













3.52 (1.07) 4.08 (1.09) 3.00 (0.97) 3.27 (1.21) .384** 1
N=86, SDs= standard deviations, **p< .01
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Fig. 3 The three ordinary least squares regressions estimated and reported in Table 5
resentative cooperativeness on outgroup trust in the high competence condition was
non-significant. This confirms that a highly competent cooperative outgroup represen-
tative did not improve trust compared to a competitive outgroup representative. Fur-
thermore, testing model 3 in Fig. 3 showed that in fact the conditional indirect effect
of representative cooperativeness on constructive behavioral tendencies via outgroup
trust was positive and significant under low competent representative conditions, and
non-significant under high competent representative conditions (see Table 6). These
results support Hypotheses 3 and 4.
6 General Discussion
The idea that cooperation improves intergroup relations is widespread (e.g., Brown
et al. 1999). Qualifying this, however, the current paper shows that cooperation by a
peripheral outgroup representative decreased perceived outgroup cooperativeness and
lowered constructive behavioral tendencies (as opposed to a competitive peripheral
representative), and cooperation by a highly competent representative (as opposed to a
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Table 6 Model coefficients for the conditional process model in Fig. 1
Moderator Indirect effect Direct effect










0.514 (0.219) 0.124 to 0.960 0.297 0.382 .440
low-competent representative) mitigated the positive effects of representative cooper-
ativeness on outgoup trust and constructive tendencies. Furthermore, we observed that
outgroup representative cooperativeness increased constructive behavioral tendencies
via perceived outgroup cooperativeness (Study 1) and trust (Study 2) only when the
outgroup representative was a prototypical member of the outgroup (Study 1) or had
low competence (Study 2). Finally, outgroup representative cooperativeness lowered
constructive behavioral tendencies via perceived outgroup cooperativeness when the
outgroup representative was a peripheral member of the outgroup (Study 1).
In Study 1, we predicted that the effect of cooperative representative behavior on
constructive behavioral tendencies would be weaker when the outgroup representative
is a peripheral member of the group. But in fact we found that the effect of cooperative
representative behavior on constructive behavioral tendencies even reversed and led to
decreased constructive tendencies when the outgroup representative was a peripheral
member of the outgroup. This suggests that perhaps there is a contrast effect between
the perception of a peripheral representative and the perception of the outgroup (e.g.,
Simpson and Ostrom 1976). This indicates that appointing an external representative
to a group to which he does not necessarily belong to may create a contrast effect on
the perceptions of the outgroup and hence cooperative behavior of the representative
may backfire.
In sum, our results show that cooperative behavior in intergroup negotiations can
both improve and undermine intergroup relations. Intriguingly, it is especially when
cooperative outgroup representatives are seen as peripheral and/or highly competent
that intergroup relations tend to sour rather than flourish. Implications for negotiation
and intergroup relations as well as some limitations of our studies are discussed below.
First, the present study provides first evidence that cooperative behavior by the
out-group representative can have negative effects on in-group members’ perceptions
of that outgroup, the extent to which they trust out-group members, and their inclina-
tion to approach out-group members in a constructive way. These findings are at odds
with the common assumption that cooperation improves intergroup relations (e.g.,
Pettigrew and Tropp 2006), and indicate that cooperation by out-group representa-
tives may backfire when the representative is perceived as peripheral and a-typical,
and/or highly competent. Whereas cooperative negotiations may promote intergroup
relations by creating more benign perceptions of, and behavioral tendencies towards,
123
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uninvolved out-group members, cooperative strategies may backfire and deteriorate
intergroup relations when representatives are not seen as typical for their group, or
when their high competence allows for alternative attributions. Future work in this
area could seek to further illuminate the underlying mechanisms that explain when
and why cooperative behavior by out-group representatives promotes, or blocks, the
development of constructive intergroup relations.
Second, our findings also contribute to extent research that investigated the relation-
ship between warmth (cooperative) and competence in person or group perceptions
(for a review please see Kervyn et al. 2010). In this line of research, some researchers
showed that warmth and competence are positively related (eg., Kelley 1950; Asch
1946; Anderson 1974), whereas others demonstrated that there is an orthogonal rela-
tionship between them (for a review, see Fiske et al. 2007) or that they are negatively
related to each other (e.g.,Yzerbyt et al. 2005; Cuddy et al. 2004). Differently from
previous research we examined the interactive relationship between cooperativeness
and competence and found that higher competence mitigates the positive effects of
representative cooperativeness on behavioral tendencies of the ingroup towards the
outgroup. Our findings call for more research to explore the interactive relationship
between cooperativeness and competence on person or group perception.
As such, our findingsmay also have relevance for representative selection.Whereas
in-group members want competent leaders and representatives (Sears and Kinder
1985), our results suggest that communicating such competence while also seeking to
cooperate with the out-group may actually undermine the positive effects of cooper-
ation on intergroup relations. Likewise, Teixeira et al. (2011) uncovered that ingroup
members sometimes prefer a representative who is pro-outgroup deviant member and,
accordingly, an a-typical in-group member.Whereas such a pro-outgroup deviant may
indeed help negotiations with the out-group, our results suggest ironic adverse effects
on intergroup relations. Relatedly, although competence, power and status are some-
times used interchangeably in the literature, we believe that a clear distinction must be
made when interpreting our results. As status may derive from respect to the person
(e.g., Bendersky andHays 2012), higher status of the outgroup representativemay even
facilitate trust and hence improve intergroup relations. Future research should inves-
tigate whether or not the cooperative behavior of high status outgroup representative
would facilitate trust and hence improve intergroup relations.
Given the contrived laboratory settings, studies reported in this article may have
limited ecological validity due to the lack of real groups or decisionswith high stakes in
the laboratory. However, both these challenges can be addressed: actual groups or their
representatives can be brought into the laboratories; negotiating representatives can be
confrontedwith high-stakes scenarios as developed byCuhadar andDruckman (2014).
In some real life contexts, ingroup members would be able to see their representative
and be in contact with their fellow group members, which may potentially influence
their perception of the outgroup (e.g., Castelli et al. 2003; Cialdini and Goldstein
2004). The ecological validity of research on representative negotiations would be
improved by taking these factors into account. The trade off is between the internal
validity obtained through control over variables and the external or ecological validity
obtained through field studies. We chose to emphasize the former in our experiments
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but encourage further studies that achieve a balance between these validities. (See
Druckman 2005, for a discussion of these issues in conflict research.)
For if the current findings hold, cooperation by a representative can indeed have
counterproductive effects on intergroup relations. Having a-typical, or highly com-
petent representatives may not be the best strategy to create constructive exchange
among competing groups.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
Appendix 1
See Table 7.
Table 7 Pay-off schedule for Group O
Salary Duration of the contract Salary increase
14,000 (00) 0.5years (00) 1% (00)
15,000 (90) 1year (30) 2% (15)
16,000 (180) 1.5years (60) 3% (30)
17,000 (270) 2years (90) 4% (45)
18,000 (360) 2.5years (120) 5% (60)
19,000 (450) 6% (75)
20,000 (540) 7% (90)
Numbers in parentheses represent the number of points that can be earned if representatives agree on that
level
Appendix 2: Manipulation Check Items for Prototypicality
On a scale from 1(not at all) to 7(very much), please indicate to what extent you would
agree with the following statements:
1. He is a very good example of his group.
2. He embodies the P-type personality very well.
3. He thinks and behaves like other Group P-members.
4. He is a very typical member of Group P.
5. He is very similar to Group P-members with respect to P-type personality.
6. According to his score, he would not be a good example of how a typical person
with P-type personality thinks and behaves. (reversed-coded)
7. He is a good reflection of the people in his group.
8. He represents what is characteristic of his group.
9. He has a lot in common with his group.
123
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